Furthermore, abstract objects, such as the number seven, don't stand in causal relationships. It is argued that the list of conceivable entities existing beyond the space-time reality contains only abstract objects and God. So if the space-time fabric had a beginning, we still need an immaterial, necessarily existing cause, outside physical space and time. You would clearly argue with the lines of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, that the space-time had a beginning in time, and must thus be contingent. This line of reasoning sounds to me very much like the thinking of Stephen Hawking (as in Question #180). (1) Could the fundamental fabric of space-time reality exist by the necessity of its own nature? This would be the analogue of quantum fields in a final theory of everything. However, here you have not commented in any way to two more universal aspects of the universe.

It is surely absurd to suggest that any particular particles could possibly act as a universal cause for the whole physical reality. You have previously answered the question 'Is Part of the Universe a Necessary Being?' (Question #235), essentially by stating that it would be absurd to suggest that a specific set of elementary particles would exist necessarily in all possible worlds, while being the cause of all the other similar particles.

The universe is further defined as all of space-time reality, including all matter and energy. This requires that the universe does not exist by the necessity of its own nature, and that anything that could possibly exist outside the universe, could not be the cause of the universe, except for God. In the Leibniz' Contingency Argument, the premise 2 states that 'If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God'. This is the weekly Q & A blog post by our Research Professor in Philosophy, Dr.

William lane craig stephen hawking